Soviet Counterinsurgency In The Soviet Afghan War

The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War

The Soviet Union annexed the regions it annexed after the Nazi-Soviet pact. The Soviet response to nationalist insurgencies between 1944 and 1953 was to use military force. The Soviet Union invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in December 1979 intending to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political-military situation in its newest client state. Afghanistan's fledgling communist government lacked the legitimacy or strength to suppress the growing Mujahideen insurgency. Instead of simply providing security, logistics, and combat support for DRA forces fighting the Mujahideen as initially planned, the conventionally structured, trained, and equipped Soviet 40th Army assumed the lead against a determined guerrilla opponent in some of the most rugged terrain on earth. The Mujahideen quickly recognized the imprudence of engaging the Soviets conventionally, and embarked upon a guerrilla campaign that leveraged both internal and transnational sanctuary in order to rest, rearm, refit, train, receive medical attention, and recruit and organize reinforcements. The Soviets properly identified sanctuary as a critical requirement for the Mujahideen to wage a successful resistance, but never effectively deprived the insurgency of this requirement. Despite tactical innovations and the ad hoc development of counterinsurgency doctrine, the Soviets lacked the troop strength and composition necessary to eliminate internal Mujahideen sanctuary in the mountains, or to interdict transnational aid and sanctuary. Afghanistan's terrain was simply too rugged and difficult for the Soviet Union to rely on air interdiction and its relatively small counterinsurgency force to adequately deny physical sanctuary or infiltration routes within the country. Soviet efforts to deny internal sanctuary drove the Mujahideen across the border into Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, Iran.

Soviet's Use of Airpower in a Counterinsurgency Campaign

Echoes of the Past
The Soviet-Afghan War

This project analyzes the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan from April of 2002 to December of 2007 and why the United States made mistakes similar to those of the Soviet Union during the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War. This research aims to show that the United States made mistakes similar to those of the Soviet Union due to the strategy and organization of the U.S. military and the harsh terrain of Afghanistan itself. The Soviet Union's initial strategy utilized a relatively small commitment. The strategy allowed the military to organize in such a way to hold the infrastructure of the country but not the rural areas where the Mujahedeen operated. The harsh terrain of Afghanistan made operating in and controlling the rural areas very difficult. As such, the insurgents were able to control the rural areas and population and force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. The initial strategy of the U.S. military was one which committed a very small amount of troops, less than 3000. This limited number of troops influenced the organization of the military to hold on to key infrastructure in the country but did not allow the U.S. to spread its control to the country side. The rough terrain of Afghanistan provided insurgent fighters safe havens while also hampering U.S. efforts to operate outside of the cities and control the rural areas. Together the three variables help show why the war in Afghanistan deteriorated and why similar mistakes were made.

Repressive States and Insurgencies

Two interesting studies on the Russian military provide unique and thought-provoking information: The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military and Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya. The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military - Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian federation has deployed forces for three different large-scale combat operations. These three operations-Chechnya 1994, Chechnya 1999, and Georgia 2008-were conducted facing in each operation, a differently structured opponent. As a result of these different structures, Russian forces were required to conduct both Combat Arms Maneuver and Counter Insurgency. This full spectrum of combat operations provides sufficient material to determine if the military of the Russian Federation has developed a new Russian way of warfare, or if Russian forces are still conducting operations utilizing the same methods as their Soviet predecessors. The determination of a new Russian way of war will be made at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare. As Russia continues to gain wealth from the sale of energy and attempts to expand influence globally, understanding the capabilities and weaknesses of the Russian military will become more important. CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * Importance and Scope of the Study * Primary and Secondary Research Questions * Soviet Way of War * Doctrine * Manning * Policy * Background: Turmoil of the Post Soviet Army * CHAPTER 2 - FIRST CHECHEN WAR * Prelude to War: Political Maneuvers and Buildup * Russian Threats Prior to Armed Conflict * Russian Military Preparation * Invasion * Fall of Grozny * Initial Attack * Siege and Fall * Russian Counterinsurgency * Aftermath * CHAPTER 3 - SECOND CHECHEN WAR * Prelude to War: de facto Chechen Independence * Russian Reaction to the Conflict in Dagestan * Political Maneuvers * Russian Military Buildup * Military Developments * Russian Invasion * Russian Siege of Grozny * Fall of Grozny * Russian Counterinsurgency * Techniques * Aftermath * CHAPTER 4 - GEORGIAN WAR * Prelude to War * Russian and Georgian Political Maneuvering * Build-up of Forces and Border Skirmishes * Initiation of Hostilities * Georgian Strategy * Russia's Strategy * Ground Forces * South Ossetia Action * Abkhazia Action * Air Force * Operational Challenges * Aftermath * Political * Economic * CHAPTER 5 - SUMMATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY * How Russian Forces Developed to fit the Operational Environment * Creation of New Doctrine and TTPs to Meet Operational Needs * Russian Organizational Development * Smaller Force * Conscription * Kontraktniki * Utilization of Soviet Doctrine and TTPs to Meet Operational Needs * Lack of Modernity * Russian Response to a Conventional Threat * Conclusion * A Post-Soviet Way of War? Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya - In this era of peacekeeping, an equally valid argument, however, can be made for the early and preventative use of force. Applying firm and decisive military force prior to the onset of hostilities can often serve to deter the potential aggressor. Crudely expressed, spilling a little blood today may preclude spilling a lot tomorrow. When dealing with those who don't share the same liberal beliefs towards conflict resolution, exhaustive diplomatic maneuverings, sanctions and warnings are interpreted as weakness and lack the persuasive power of a resolute, though limited, use of force. In the first Russian military involvement in Chechnya (October 1994-September 1996), we saw a sloppy mixture of these two approaches. Russian tanks crossed into Chechnya in December 1994 to "establish constitutional order in Chechnya and to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia." This drastic step was the last in a series of increasingly forceful and largely unsuccessful attempts to remove Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev from power.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain

The Soviet invasion of its neighbour Afghanistan in December 1979 sparked a bloody nine-year conflict in that
country until Soviet forces withdrew in 1988–89, dooming the communist Afghanistan government to defeat at the hands of the Mujahideen, the Afghan popular resistance backed by the USA and other powers. The Soviet invasion had enormous implications on the global stage; it prompted the US Senate to refuse to ratify the hard-won SALT II arms-limitation treaty, and the USA and 64 other countries boycotted the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics. For Afghanistan, the invasion served to prolong the interminable civil war that pitted central government against the regions and faction against faction. The country remains locked in conflict over 30 years later, with no end in sight. Featuring specially drawn mapping and drawing upon a wide range of sources, this succinct account explains the origins, history and consequences of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, thereby shedding new light on the more recent history – and prospects – of that troubled country.

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency

Nearly eight years since initiating combat operations in Afghanistan, the United States and our allies are witnessing first-hand the difficulty of denying sanctuary to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Similar to the Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War, today’s insurgents are leveraging mountainous terrain and international borders to survive against a superpower’s counterinsurgency efforts. As the United States prepares to shift focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, it behooves us to incorporate lessons learned from the Soviet-Afghan War in order to adequately shape our force and equipment, evolve counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine, and integrate the elements of national power to deny insurgent sanctuary. I chose to study the Soviet efforts to deny the Mujahideen sanctuary because I believe sanctuary denial is a critical requirement for our success in the current fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Soviet Union did not anticipate a decade-long counterinsurgency fight against the Mujahideen when it invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in December 1979. Determined to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political-military situation in its newest client state, the Soviet Union conducted a coup de main modeled after successful interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The Soviet leadership believed that “...the mere presence of Soviet forces would serve to ‘sober up’ the Mujahideen” and enable the DRA’s communist government to suppress the insurgency. Failing to appreciate the will of the Mujahideen to resist foreign invaders, the Soviets miscalculated the nature of the war into which they entered. Instead of simply providing security, logistics, and combat support for DRA forces fighting the Mujahideen, the conventionally structured, trained, and equipped 40th Army assumed the lead against a determined guerrilla opponent in some of the most rugged terrain on earth. The Soviets properly identified sanctuary as a critical requirement for the Mujahideen to wage a successful resistance, but never effectively deprived the insurgency of this requirement. The Soviet Union failed to deny sanctuary to the Mujahideen because it deployed an inadequate force to Afghanistan, but more importantly, it proved unable to counteract international support for the insurgency. PREFACE * INTRODUCTION * SANCTUARY DEFINED * GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT * DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURE * BACKGROUND * POLITICAL TURMOIL IN THE 1970s * SOVIET COMBAT OPERATIONS * INADEQUATE FORCE TO DENY SANCTUARY * COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN * CONCLUSIONS * NOTES * APPENDIX A - AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS * APPENDIX B - AFGHANISTAN 3-D RELIEF MAP * APPENDIX C - MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS OF AFGHANISTAN * BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliography of Soviet Guerrilla Warfare and Soviet Underground Activities

Helicopters in Irregular Warfare

Understanding the conflict in North Caucasus may be the key to understanding the future of the post-communist Russian state, its interaction with Islam, as well as regional mountainous insurgencies. The region’s turbulent past and present make it a potential source of future waves of instability both within Russia and abroad; especially if the Kremlin and the Russian and local elites fail to deal with accumulating local economic, social, religious, and political pressures.

Counterinsurgency and Soviet Force Structure

Protracted Warfare

Essay from the year 2009 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: Russia, grade: 1,7, University of Wales, Aberystwyth (Department of International Politics), language: English, abstract: Throughout the 1980s the war in Afghanistan, which started as a civil war, developed into a “bloody Cold War battlefield” (Jalali, 2001: 85) with Soviet troops fighting alongside Afghan government troops against resistance fighters supported by Pakistan and
the USA. During this almost ten years lasting war, which ended with the withdrawal of the Red Army in February 1989, the Soviet Union failed to defeat the Mujahedin primarily due to an initially false strategic alignment and severe tactical deficiencies.

The Russian Way of War

In terms of Clausewitz' paradoxical trinity, the German counter insurgency in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union 1941-1944, did not achieve a sense of balance. The second two legs of the trinity, the play of chance and probability and the element of subordination, were subverted by primordial violence and enmity. Clausewitz offers his paradoxical trinity as a viable framework for analyzing the inherent complexities of warfare. The three interdependent, dynamic aspects of the trinity must be balanced against each other if a successful plan for war is to prevail. Additionally, Clausewitz addresses the dynamics of insurgencies and counter insurgencies. With these two analytical frameworks, an examination of a specific campaign becomes plausible. The German efforts to thwart the partisan uprising in the occupied territories of the Eastern Front from 1941-1944 reflected the interplay of the Clausewitz triad. Primordial violence was imbued in the German people as a result of National Socialist indoctrination. The play of chance and probability reflected the largely successful active and passive measures employed by the German armed forces behind German lines in the east. The element of subordination was manifested in the pernicious Nazi policies and directives that inevitably dictated the conduct of the armed forces. As a result of Hitler's imbalanced, irrational eastern strategy and sequent war on the partisans, primordial violence, enmity, and hatred superseded the other two legs of the trinity. Hitler's unlimited political and military objectives ultimately were incompatible with the German Army's ability to pragmatically prosecute the eastern war and pacify the population that supported the partisan resistance.

Strategy, Organizations, and Terrain

In December, 1979 the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan and has been involved in a counterinsurgency ever since. This study looks at one aspect of that conflict, Soviet airpower. Using the case study format it examines some doctrinal tenets that drive the Soviet's use of airpower and specifically how they are employing their assets in Afghanistan. By viewing their tactics and choices of weapons, Western observers can learn a great deal about the Soviet military's capabilities. The study concludes with some of the lessons that have emerged from this conflict.

The Soviet–Afghan War 1979–89

This book offers the first analysis of the brutalisation paradigm in counter-insurgency warfare. Minimising the use of force and winning over the population's opinion is said to be the cornerstone of success in modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Yet, this tells only one side of the story. Drawing upon primary data collected during interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Russian-Chechen War, as well as from secondary sources, this book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the long-neglected logic underpinning brutalisation-centred COIN campaigns. It offers a comprehensive systematisation of the brutalisation paradigm and challenges the widespread assumption of brutalisation as an underperforming paradigm of COIN warfare. It shows that, although appalling, brutalisation-centred measures can deliver success. The book also outlines a stigmatised yet widely deployed set of COIN measures and provides critical insights into how Western military blueprints can be improved without compromising important moral and ethical requirements. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, military and strategic studies, Russian politics, and International Relations.

Counterinsurgency Warfare and Brutalisation

Specialenheder; Special Forces; JSOC(Joint Special Operations Command); CIA; KGB; GRU; NSWG(Naval Special Warfare Group); SEAL Missions; Rangers; Delta; Direct Action; Indirect Action; Reagan Doctrine; SOF(Special Operations Forces); Security Troops; Surrogate Support; Special Operations Task; Hostage Rescue; Insurgent; Terrorist Cells; Counterterrorism; Strategic Sabotage.

The Soviet-Afghan War: Another Look

The aim of this paper is to determine the presence or absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The development of these central themes should contribute to the secondary goals of the paper; first, to establish a fuller basis of comparison than is currently used in examination of Soviet and Soviet-advised counterinsurgent campaigns, and second, to add some historical depth to the developing body of work on Soviet counterinsurgency. This should allow for some useful generalizations about the Soviet
approach to counterinsurgent warfare to be derived. Counterinsurgency became a preoccupation of the U.S. military during the late fifties and early sixties. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam sustained interest in counterinsurgency and new challenges to U.S. interests in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have renewed attention to issues of counterinsurgency in the eighties. Although the insurgents (primarily the Central Asian Basmachi), and comparative surveys of the counterinsurgency campaigns of the Soviets in Afghanistan and various Soviet allies fighting insurgents since 1975. For the purpose of establishing the patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency the limited number of cases in the first two approaches is too narrow. Although the third approach examines more cases, it mixes dissimilar cases and blurs distinctions between Soviet methods of counterinsurgency and the methods of Soviet advised militaries fighting insurgencies.

A Case Study of Soviet Counterinsurgency

Soviet Counterinsurgency

This research effort reviews the Soviet military's involvement in Afghanistan from four general, perspectives: (1) systemic problems inherent in the Soviet military culture, (2) the use of surprise, (3) operational maneuver and the preeminence of aviation and (4) employment of mines and chemical weapons as an extension of maneuver warfare. This paper concludes that the lessons of this war have been learned by the Russians. There is every reason to believe that they can achieve the level of doctrinal changes required to be successful in future “local” interventions. It must be accompanied, however, by corresponding socio-military reform.

Russia's Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus

counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror. Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.

Cold War Lithuania

Echoes of the Past

In part 1 these essays are concerned with aspects of Soviet policy including political relations, Soviet perceptions of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and the Soviet use of propaganda in the Third World. Part 2 is concerned with economic affairs, and the last section includes case-studies.

Soviet Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 1979-1989

This bibliography is oriented toward guerrillas and guerrilla warfare as a weapon system used by the Soviet Army in fighting the Germans. While it relates basically to the tactics and techniques of Soviet guerrilla fighting during World War II, it was an element of a larger study designed to explore internal (revolutionary) was as an instrument and process of socio-political change.

The Blind Leading the Blind

The preponderance of conflicts fought over the last seventy years have included or been centered on irregular warfare and counter-insurgency. Indeed, the helicopter's first significant trials in combat took place during the Algerian War 1954-1962, the Vietnam War 1955-1975, and the Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989. During these wars, French, U.S., and Soviet militaries used significant numbers of helicopters to fight insurgents and guerrillas, and each country lost their respective conflict. As conventional organizations, these militaries used helicopters to seek military dominance, often blind to or in spite of politico-strategic goals like legitimacy. The helicopter's firepower and mobility tactically decimated insurgents, but the nature of irregular warfare rendered tactical dominance indecisive. Helicopters were indecisive or bad at enabling legitimacy, population control, and isolation, key tenets of successful COIN. Convinced that helicopter enabled military dominance could win, the French, U.S., and Soviet militaries were unable to balance the pursuit of military and politically objectives. Airmobility distracted leaders from focusing on the political aspects of counter-insurgency. CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * Warfare Terms Defined * Literature Review * Algeria
Soviet Counterinsurgency

Artillery and Counterinsurgency

Primordial Violence: German War On The Soviet Partisans

The aim of this thesis is to determine the presence or absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The thesis examines the place of counterinsurgency in Soviet military thought and compares the Soviet counterinsurgent campaigns in Soviet Central Asia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Afghanistan. The thesis concludes that a pattern of Soviet counterinsurgency evolved in spite of the absence of an official doctrine but that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan may inspire changes in the Soviet approach to counterinsurgency. (KR).

Green Berets, Seals, and Spetsnaz

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Coalition forces discovered that the military, security, and intelligence agencies of Iraq were well suited to transition into an insurgency after conventional defensive measures had failed. This paper argues that this is the habitual norm for repressive totalitarian regimes when faced with invasion. This paper examines existing counterinsurgency theories, and then uses the case study method to compare the werwolf movement in 1945-46 Nazi Germany, the partisan resistance movement in the 1941-44 Soviet Union, and the ongoing Iraqi insurgency. It compares how these movements were planned, organized, manned, and executed. It examines the three insurgencies for common threads and themes. The conclusions of this paper are that repressive regimes are well suited to defend themselves through post-hostility guerrilla movements, and the decision to do so is common. The success or failure of such decisions is a function of several factors. These are the speed and strength of the occupying force, the ability of the defeated government’s survivors to demonstrate unity of effort, and adequate time and safe areas for the regime survivors to rally and organize. Military planners should expect such movements as a likely outcome of victory and plan accordingly. Defeating such insurgencies is intensive in terms of time, troop commitment, and resources, however. Regardless of its prowess in fighting in high-intensity conflicts, the US military should expect to execute counterinsurgency operations as part of future expeditionary operations. Theory * Soviet Union, 1941-1944 * Germany, 1945-1946 * Iraq, 2003-present * Recommendations * Conclusions * Bibliography

Fighting in the Mountains and Among the People

Studying Soviet Low-intensity Conflicts

The Soviet-Afghan War

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This
monograph examines the imperial Russian campaign to quell rebellion in the North Caucasus from 1801 to 1864 and the Bolshevik suppression of the Basmachi rebellion in Central Asia from 1919 to 1933. The Caucasian War and the Basmachi rebellion featured Muslim insurgent movements that exploited inaccessible mountain terrain and relied upon the local population for recruitment and support. The imperial Russians and Bolsheviks both struggled to adapt their civil and military operations to defeat an elusive enemy and establish control over a diverse and fractured society. The analysis tests the effectiveness of key principles found in population-centric counterinsurgency theory and doctrine in the imperial Russian and Bolshevik counterinsurgent operations. The evidence suggests that the synchronization of military and nonmilitary operations through unity of effort contributed to Russian and Bolshevik victory by isolating the insurgent forces from the local population. The analysis also identifies significant risks and costs associated with employing a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency. The September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States precipitated lengthy wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following brief periods of conventional warfare, both conflicts transitioned into extended stages of unconventional warfare. The rise of insurgents with close ties to the local population in Afghanistan and Iraq challenged the conventionally oriented US military, and forced a reconsideration of US Army doctrine. Officers examined past counterinsurgency campaigns to determine the proper way to adapt to the new threat. Under the leadership of the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, the US Army created a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006 that emphasized the integration of military and nonmilitary operations. The US Army’s new doctrine drew upon the counterinsurgency theories of French officers in the Algerian Civil War, and diverse historical examples from the British in Malay to the Soviets in Afghanistan to inform the US Army’s approach to the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies. Despite the breadth of historical analysis of past ”small wars,” officers and students of military affairs largely ignored two examples of counterinsurgencies with striking similarities to the United States’ post-September 11th conflicts. The imperial Russian Caucasian campaigns from 1801 to 1864 and the Soviet suppression of the Basmachi rebellion from 1918 to 1933 provide excellent case studies to test the counterinsurgency principles codified in the 2006 publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Both conflicts pitted predominately-ethnic Russian forces against Muslim insurgent movements that relied upon the support of their local populations in largely inaccessible mountainous regions. The organization and doctrine of the imperial Russian and Soviet militaries centered on conventional warfare, and both armies struggled to adapt to the unconventional tactics of their adversaries. The Russians and the Bolsheviks each enjoyed significant military and economic advantages over their enemies, but often failed to translate their superior might into tactical success.

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Counterinsurgency and Ethnic/sectarian Rivalry in Comparative Perspective

Why did the Soviet Union fail to defeat the Mujahedin?

Russia, like the United States, has experienced its struggles with counterinsurgency warfare. In Afghanistan, the Russian General Staff chose to approach the operation with a violently offensive mindset. This mindset prevented them from achieving their desired outcomes because they initially alienated the populace they needed to succeed. Then, when they realized their approach was not achieving the desired outcomes, they made only minor adjustments to their approach because they did not view this as a significant challenge to their military model. Then, when presented a similar situation in Chechnya, instead of approaching the operation using the lessons learned from Afghanistan, the General Staff chose to use the same violent tactics employed during the invasion of Afghanistan. This monograph seeks to understand this phenomenon. This monograph is applicable to the United States in that it demonstrates that a nation must not become wedded to a specific approach in order to succeed in future war. During the post-Vietnam era, the United States chose to put aside the lessons learned from counterinsurgency warfare and focus on a comfortable and conventional form of warfare. It seems America is doing the same thing again with respect to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, by focusing on evading such wars altogether. 

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Counterinsurgencies - Soviet Military History, Operational Art, World War II, Interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia

Soviet Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Strategy in Afghanistan

The rules of engagement in the third world are as structured as a ballet. This volume examines how US and Soviet foreign policies address Guerrilla warfare in the third world and gives a broad strategic analysis of low-intensity conflict objectives and constraints. Twenty-eight contributions. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Soviet Counterinsurgency

United States and Soviet Special Operations

This monograph examines the Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979-1988) in terms of Soviet Army tactics and organization for combat. Throughout the decade of the 1970's, U.S. perceptions of Soviet ground force tactics stressed a general lack of initiative and flexibility in their military doctrine. In the 1980's a re-evaluation of Soviet thinking occurred which saw greater flexibility at the operational and strategic levels. If the experience in Afghanistan has shown that set-piece tactics will not work in all types of warfare, and the Soviets are able to incorporate higher levels of initiative and flexibility into their tactical doctrine, then the U.S. may be required to refocus its training away from the stylized Soviet enemy. This study begins with a background discussion of Soviet historical involvement in Afghanistan to include counter-insurgency experience in their southwestern border area. It then covers the actual invasion and units employed with emphasis on their pre-deployment status and subsequent performance. The following section divides the war into four phases to ease understanding. The monograph subsequently looks at lessons learned and principles reaffirmed from both the Soviet and U.S. perspective. A key feature is the need the Soviets apparently feel for Western style initiative and flexibility at lower command levels (battalion, company and platoon), and how this is inconsistent with their culture and system of command and control.

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